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Abstract: An important question to microfinance is the relevance of 
existing social capital in target communities to the performance 
of group lending.  This research presents evidence from field 
experiments in South Africa and Armenia, in which subjects 
participate in trust and microfinance games.  We present evidence 
that personal trust between group members and peer homogeneity 
are more important to group loan repayment than general societal 
trust or acquaintanceship between members. We also find some 
evidence of reciprocity: those who have been helped by other group 
members in the past are more likely to contribute in the future. 
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1.  Introduction 
During the past decade, exploring the role that social capital plays in economic behavior has 
emerged as one of the most fascinating and fertile areas of economic research.  Although 
precise definitions of social capital are notoriously difficult to pin down, one of the early 
pioneers of the concept, James Coleman (1988), defines social capital as “social structure that 
facilitates certain actions of actors within the structure.”  In his definition, Coleman specifically 
highlights the roles of mutual obligation, expectations and trustworthiness, social norms, social 
sanctions, and the transmission of information.  
 Important studies in both developed and developing countries have analyzed the 
impact of social capital in economic relationships.  Robert Putnam’s celebrated work, Making 
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993) and Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social 
Capital (1995), brought attention to the role that social capital plays in the development of the 
modern state.  Christopher Udry’s ground-breaking (1994) work in Nigeria illustrated how the 
social capital existing in traditional societies may allow for more efficient credit contracts than 
in developed economies with weaker social capital.   
This research uses experimental methods to estimate the importance of social capital 
to the success of group lending, a commonly used tool to deliver credit to the poor in 
developing countries.  Although group lending has been shown to be correlated with higher 
portfolio quality in microfinance institutions (see, for example, Cull, Demirgüc, and Morduch 
in this feature), empirical work that has tried to isolate the influence of social capital on group 
loan repayment has faced a number of challenges.  First, social capital and its various 
components are notoriously hard to measure.  Moreover, groups often self-select over 
different components of social capital, thus making it endogenous to actual loan repayment.  
While some recent work, such as the articles in this feature by Ahlin and Townsend and by 
Karlan, has made important inroads in ameliorating these difficulties, our research investigates 
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the influence of social capital using a different approach.  We examine the effect of different 
components of relational social capital on group loan repayment by carrying out microfinance 
experiments on pools of subjects that reflect the characteristics of actual microloan recipients 
in Nyanga, South Africa and Berd, Armenia.  In short, data from our experiments indicate that 
relational social capital in the form of personal trust between individuals and social 
homogeneity within groups has a positive effect on borrowing group performance.  In 
contrast, we find that social capital as measured by simple acquaintanceship with other 
individuals or an individual’s general trust in society via responses to the standard General 
Social Survey questions has little effect on group performance. 
Economists have developed numerous theories that seek to explain the high 
repayment rates frequently associated with group lending in developing countries.  These 
theories can be roughly divided into three categories: 1) those that view the relational aspects of 
social capital as central to the performance of group lending; 2) those that view the informational 
aspects of social capital as central to the performance of group lending; and 3) those that view 
the merits of group lending (relative to individual lending) solely through its innate properties 
as a joint-liability contract, where social capital plays little or no role.  The distinction is 
important.  If the first two groups of theories hold, the existing level of social capital in the 
form of strong personal relationships or local information may be critical to group lending’s 
success.  If the third group of theories holds, then group lending may succeed whether or not 
it is implemented among borrowers with high levels of existing social capital.  Our 
experiments primarily seek to ascertain the influence of relational social capital on group 
performance, and the type of relational social capital that is most critical to it.  However, we 
believe our results also may have implications for informational social capital since, in practice, 
borrowers use private information to self-select over aspects of relational social capital that 
may be conducive to the performance of their borrowing group.  
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In borrowing groups with high levels of relational capital, strong social ties generate 
trust that other group members will contribute their share toward repaying group loans, thus 
making it worthwhile for each individual to repay.  Moreover, because group members are 
jointly liable for repayment of the loan of each group member, they have an incentive to 
pressure fellow members who fail to maximize the probability that their own share of the 
group loan will be repaid.  Ostensibly, the stronger the ties between group members, the 
greater the potential exists for social sanctions, and thus the more likely these sanctions are to 
lie off the equilibrium path, implying higher group loan repayment rates.   
The most well-known paper in this category is that of Besley and Coate (1995), who 
argue that without the potential for social sanctions, group lending may offer little if any 
advantage over individual lending.  However, given that sanctions are sufficiently strong, 
group lending in their model is able to curtail the moral hazard associated with loan 
repayment.  Social sanctions, combined with peer monitoring also play a role in papers such as 
Stiglitz (1990), Besley, Banerjee and Guinnane (1993) and Armendáriz de Aghion (1999), 
though in focusing on peer monitoring, social sanctions are typically assumed to be exogenous.  
In the model of Wydick (2001), sanctions in the form of group expulsion are endogenous in 
that they represent a credible threat that comprises part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
punishment strategy.  Given a sufficiently low level of peer monitoring between borrowers, it 
is rational for group members to replace a defaulting member with a new member, even when 
there is no informational evidence of risky borrower behavior.  In a high-information 
environment, expulsions and group replacements are only carried out if there is observable 
evidence of risky behavior.  The threat of social sanctions over and above group expulsion, 
however, only adds to the incentive to undertake safe investments.  While the threat of social 
sanctions can clearly discipline borrowers in many of these papers, it is often unclear if simple 
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group expulsion, and the resulting loss of low-interest credit, is able to act as a strong 
substitute for social sanctions.   
  Papers in the second category focus on the heightened informational flows that exist 
in high social-capital areas, and their impact on group loan repayment.  Foremost among these 
are papers by Van Tassel (1999) and Ghatak (1999) who both demonstrate that the borrower 
self-selection process used in most group lending schemes improves repayment rates through 
mitigating adverse selection in credit markets.  If borrowers have clear information over the 
riskiness of one another's projects, they sort themselves into homogeneous groups through an 
assortative matching process.  Van Tassel’s model in particular shows how a lender can offer a 
set of individual and group loan contracts such that only high-ability borrowers will accept the 
group loan contract in equilibrium.  The intuition is similar to the way insurance companies 
offer separate car insurance contracts to single and married drivers: Insurance companies 
know that married drivers tend to be safer, and that would be irrational to get married simply 
to pay less for car insurance.  In Ghatak’s model, risky borrowers internalize their externality 
on the group through being yoked with other risky borrowers.  Safe borrowers are drawn back 
into the credit pool as the equilibrium interest rate is reduced, thus increasing repayment rates.  
In both models, existing social capital is important only in that it facilitates informational flow 
between borrowers; social sanctions are unnecessary to their results. 
A third view of group lending downplays the influence of existing social capital in the 
performance of group lending altogether. The advantages of group lending over individual 
lending rest on neither the potential for social sanctions nor informational flows between 
members. Instead, the potential advantage of group lending arises simply from the terms of a 
joint liability contract.  The best example of this view is Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier 
(2000).  They show that, in a pool of “safe” and “risky” borrowers, if the higher return realized 
by a risky borrower in the good state of nature is (uniquely) sufficient to cover for a defaulting 
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group member, then the group lending contract can reduce the equilibrium interest rate and 
induce higher repayment rates relative to individual lending.  The interesting point about their 
result is that unlike the models of Van Tassel and Ghatak, it does not rely on borrowers having 
an informational advantage over the lender.  Their model is, however, sensitive to changes in 
assumptions about borrower returns.  
Some empirical work has sought to discriminate between these three classes of group 
lending theories, but results have yielded mixed results.  Wenner (1995) provides some 
evidence that active screening and social pressure among members of twenty-five Costa Rican 
credit groups improved group performance.  Zeller (1998) finds credit group performance 
positively related to social cohesion within groups.  Wydick (1999) finds that while peer 
monitoring appears to have some positive effect on group loan repayment, strong social ties 
within groups appears to make it more difficult to pressure fellow members to repay loans.   
More recent research on larger microfinance data sets has yielded fascinating, but 
somewhat contradictory results on this question.  Gómez and Santor (2003) use a statistical 
matching model to compare default rates of 1,389 individual and group borrowers in a 
Canadian lending institution.  Based on observable variables, they find both selection and 
incentive effects to be operational in explaining lower default rates for group loans relative to 
individual loans.   Moreover, incentive effects appear to be strengthened when “low trust” 
groups are removed from the sample, leaving groups within which there existed a higher 
degree of trust before applying for the loan.  Their results, however, depend on the 
assumption that unobservable characteristics are uncorrelated with borrowing group 
formation.  If borrowing groups admit members based on characteristics unobservable to the 
researcher, the results could overstate group-borrowing effects.  Nevertheless, their findings 
present evidence in favor of the positive effects of informational and relational social capital 
on group loan repayment. 
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The conclusions of Ahlin and Townsend (this feature) contrast somewhat with those 
of Gómez and Santor.  Ahlin’s and Townsends logit estimation results support the group self-
selection models in the wealthier central region near Bangkok, and the models emphasizing the 
importance of social sanctions in the poorer, northeastern Thailand.  Yet the fact that they 
find strong social ties within borrowing groups to be negatively correlated with group 
repayment causes them to challenge the idea that group lending works through its ability to 
harness all types of existing social capital.  They argue that aspects of social capital that 
facilitate social penalties for non-repayment of group loans can be helpful to group lending, 
while social capital that inhibits social penalties can be harmful. 
The particular angle that we take with our research is most similar to that of Abbink, 
Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002), Giné et. al. (2005), and Karlan (2005), who use experimental 
methods to analyze group lending repayment.  We use the taxonomy developed by Harrison 
and List (2004) to categorize our own work within this body of experimental research.     
Abbink et. al. carry out a conventional lab experiment in which students in the social 
sciences at the University of Erfurt participate in a microfinance game.  Student subjects were 
formed into 31 borrowing groups of varying sizes; groups were rewarded with subsequent 
“loans” upon repayment of the previous loan.  The game involves a stochastic element:  Each 
student-borrower faces a 1/6 probability of a negative shock, forcing her to depend on fellow 
members to repay the amount due on the group loan.  The researchers are able to draw 
interesting conclusions about the effect of group size, gender, and social ties on loan 
repayment.  To isolate the effect of social ties, they used two separate recruitment techniques.  
Some groups were formed of students registering individually for the experiment, minimizing 
the degree of social ties between members.  Other participants registered together in groups; in 
these groups social ties were stronger.  Some of their results are intriguing.  Self-selected 
groups contributed mightily in the first round, but cooperation tended to fizzle among these 
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groups in later rounds, while the cooperation of the randomly chosen groups started lower, 
but became more stable than the self-selected groups as the rounds progressed.  Their results 
show that social ties within groups induce higher, but less stable, group loan repayment and 
that the performance of borrowing groups with initially weak social ties may grow with 
experience together in group loan repayment. 
Giné et. al. (2005) carry out a framed field experiment  in which subjects in central Lima 
received a “loan” of 100 points.  A framed field experiment differs from an artefactual field 
experiment in that the experimenter attempts to replicate, or “frame” the experiment in the 
context of the actual task under study (in this case group, loan repayment).  Subjects in their 
study had to invest their loan in either a safe project (yielding a certain return of 200 points) or 
risky project (yielding a return of 600 points with probability ½ and zero otherwise).  In their 
experiment the researchers introduce multiple rounds contingent on project success, joint-
liability, complete information on one’s partner’s project choice and outcome, communication 
between partners, and election of partners.  The varying permutations allow the authors to 
identify the importance of dynamic incentives, insurance, monitoring, free-riding, and group 
formation, respectively.  Taken together, Giné et. al. find evidence that group lending may 
actually induce moral hazard (through risk-taking and free-riding) rather than reduce it, though 
group self-selection counteracts some of these problems.  
Karlan’s (2005) research employs an artefactual field experiment, which he then links to 
observational data.  An artefactual experiment differs from a conventional lab experiment in 
that it uses a non-standard subject pool that is pertinent to the issue being studied: Members 
of 41 female borrowing groups in a Peruvian microfinance program in Karlan’s research 
replace the usual student subjects.  He then tracks the behavior of these same subjects over the 
course of one year after they received real microfinance loans.  Initially, experimenters had 
each of the subjects play the trust game in which either zero, 1, 2, or 3 coins are passed from 
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player A to a partner, player B.  If at least one coin was passed, the experimenters matched the 
contribution to player B, who could pass back as many coins as desired to player A.  
Karlan finds that some characteristics related to cultural homogeneity such as both 
partners being indigenous, living nearby, and attending the same church are correlated with 
player A originally passing more coins, though social cohesion has a much weaker affect on 
the number of coins passed from B back to A.  Over the course of the next year as borrowers 
repay their loans, the propensity for a borrower to pass coins in the role of player A is actually 
correlated with a lower level of savings and a higher rate of group expulsion/dropout.  Karlan 
accounts for this result by noting that a higher propensity for a player A to pass coins may 
reflect a higher propensity to gamble rather than a higher propensity to trust.  Additionally he 
finds that positive responses by borrowers to General Social Survey questions intended to 
measure social capital are negatively correlated with default and group dropout. Taken 
together, his results indicate moderate support for importance of existing social capital 
between members to group lending, but specifically the importance of innate trustworthiness, 
as opposed to trustworthiness driven by the fear of social sanctions.   
Our research consists of both artefactual and framed field experiment components, in that 
we employ the trust game used by Karlan and the microfinance game of Abbink et. al. 
respectively.  While Karlan’s work was carried out among indigenous peoples of Western 
Hemisphere, we choose two very different locations: Nyanga, South Africa for a smaller pilot 
study and Berd, Armenia for our main study.  As Ahlin and Townsend show in this feature, 
the relative effects of different joint-liability mechanisms may display considerable variation 
between clients and geographic regions.  Thus we see it as advantageous to look for similarities 
and differences in the relationship between existing social ties and group loan repayment 
between substantially different subject pools and geographical areas. 
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We favor the microfinance game developed by Abbink et. al. because it effectively 
captures the idea that group lending is heavily dependent on dynamic incentives.  Individuals 
have an incentive to repay group loans if they believe a critical mass of other members will do 
the same, in order that they can receive future group loans.  The belief that other members will 
contribute in the current round is partially a function of the social capital that exists within the 
borrowing group, which may be a product of a borrowing group member’s (a) generalized 
trust in her society as a whole, (b) level of acquaintanceship with fellow group members, (c) 
specific trust toward group members, or (d) trust that emerges from early rounds of positive 
experience with other members in group loan repayment. 
We use virtually the same experimental methodology among our smaller study in 
South Africa as we do in Armenia, though our questions to ascertain the level of social 
cohesion within microfinance game groups obviously needed to be distinct between sites.  
(E.g. there are no clans in Armenia, and no post-Perestroika generation in South Africa.)  
We use results from our trust games to obtain measures of trust and trustworthiness for our 
microfinance games.  We also include measures of existing levels of trust and social capital 
between the subjects in our 36 microfinance game groups such as age, intensity of relationship, 
years members have known one another, whether a subject would be willing to lend another 
subject money, and distance between their homes.  If our different measures of relational 
social capital within our exogenously formed borrowing groups are significantly associated 
with superior borrowing group performance in our experiments, then we would interpret this 
as evidence that these aspects of relational social capital may matter to real-world group loan 
repayment.  To the extent that these measures of relational social capital are insignificantly 
related to borrowing group performance, we would take this as evidence that variability in 
borrowing group performance may be due to other factors which we do not account for in our 
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experiments such as peer monitoring or contractual variations. We include results from both 
individual group member and group repayment decisions. 
Our results indicate first that specific trust between a borrower and other individual 
group members appears to be relatively more important than trust in society as a whole for 
group loan repayment.  This holds true for our subjects in both South Africa and Armenia.  
We find that group loan repayment appears to be more heavily associated with affirmative 
answers to questions such as, "Would you lend (person x) 1000 drams?” than questions from 
the General Social Survey intended to measure broadly existing trust in society.  Second, we 
find moderate evidence that social homogeneity in borrowing groups may be helpful.  Having 
a larger number of one's own clan as members in the group spurred individual contributions in 
South Africa, while having a high number and homogeneous makeup of long-term local 
residents facilitated group repayment in Armenia.  Third, we find mere acquaintanceship 
between members to be unrelated to group performance.  Since social sanctions are generally 
ineffectual without at least weak social ties between individuals, our study suggests that 
potential social sanctions may not be the most important component of relational social capital 
to influence group loan repayment; interpersonal trust appears to be more important.   
We also find that when group repayment begins to break down from random shocks 
or non-contribution, individuals withhold their own contributions, apparently to avoid getting 
burned by contributing to a losing cause.  But our results also reveal evidence of reciprocity: 
When a member experiencing a negative shock is helped by others to repay the group loan, 
the benefiting member is more likely to contribute in the subsequent round. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides details of our 
experimental methodology in Nyanga and Berd.  Section 3 presents and discusses results from 
our experimental data.  Section 4 concludes with a summary of how our results compare with 
those of the existing empirical literature. 
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2. Experimental Design 
Locations 
We conducted a smaller, pilot experiment at the SHAWCO1 Senior Centre in Nyanga, 
Cape Town, South Africa, pop. 24,003.  Nyanga is a poor town, made up of nearly all black 
residents, and where annual per capita income is approximately 30,553 rand (US$4,460) 
(Republic of South Africa 2003 National Census).  The HIV prevalence rate in Nyanga is one 
of the highest in the area.  The subjects were identified by the neighborhood representatives of 
the local municipality and experienced SHAWCO staff as women who fit the profile of the 
typical microcredit borrower in the region: eighteen years of age and older, either employed or 
available for work2, and willing to participate in the experiment that took place from June 10th 
to July 10th, 2004.  From the pool of potential subjects, a systematic sampling took place 
whereby a subject fitting the profile from every fifth eligible household was selected to 
participate.   
We conducted our second, larger experiment at the Artig Business Company (ABC) in 
Berd, Tavush Marz, Armenia (pop. 8,700), with per capita income 1,830,000 drams 
(US$3,900), roughly comparable to Nyanga.  The subjects were identified by the ABC using 
the same criteria established above, with the experimental period lasting from March 19th to 
April 6th, 2005.  In both experiments, any women who had a previous professional relation 
with either the SHAWCO in Nyanga or the ABC in Armenia or who had ever been part of a 
joint-liability borrowing group were excluded from the subject pool.  In Nyanga, 87 women 
completed the general survey, 62 of them participated in the trust game experiment, and 60 
participated in the microfinance experiment.3  In Berd, 160 women completed the general 
                                                 
1
 Student Health and Welfare Committee, a student run NGO sponsored by the University of Cape Town. 
2
 The definition of “available for work” considered whether the potential subject could participate in the 
Masizikhulise Project.   
3
 Tests on self-selection into the game in Nyanga revealed those who opted to participate in the microfinance 
game tended to be slightly poorer, were somewhat more religious, and somewhat more politically inclined.   
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survey and participated in the trust game experiment, and 156 of them participated in the 
microfinance experiment.  
Survey  
In the Nyanga experiment, the subjects filled out a 38-question survey, which took 
approximately fifteen to twenty minutes to complete.  The survey contained demographic 
questions such as age, length of residency, spoken languages, clan name as well as questions 
related to the various affiliations of the subject, her level of participation in groups and 
associations (e.g. political organizations, churches, ROSCAS, etc.).  
In Berd, the subjects filled out a 26-question survey that also required about fifteen to 
twenty minutes to complete. 4  In addition to questions related to demographic characteristics 
and the subject’s involvement in society, the Berd questionnaire included three attitudinal 
questions from the General Social Survey (GSS) that relate to trust (also used in Karlan, 
2005).5  The subjects were guaranteed a minimum of 1,500 drams upon completion of the 
survey and the two follow-up activities with final payment depending on the outcomes of the 
games.  (We were careful not to mention the word “game” or “play” in favor of the more 
neutral terms “activity” and “decision making”).  
After completing the surveys, the subjects participated in the trust game and 
microfinance game experiments. In Berd we alternated the order in which the experiments 
were played to account for the possible dependence of one game’s results from the results of 
the game previously played. 
                                                 
4
 Both the Berd and Nyanga surveys are available at http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/acassar. 
 
5
 The three GSS questions we used were the commonly administered trust question, “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be to careful in dealing with people?”, the 
question on fairness, "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or 
would they try to be fair?", and the question on helpfulness, "Would you say that most of the time people try 
to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?". 
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Trust Game 
As in the original trust game design of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), pairs of 
individuals are randomly matched and assigned the role of either “sender” or “receiver.”  
In the Berd experiment, our largest subject pool, we ran two kinds of treatments: a treatment 
with equal initial endowments (senders and receivers starting with 1,000 drams), as well as a 
treatment with unequal endowments (senders starting with 1,000 drams and receivers starting 
with 400 drams). In Nyanga we ran only the unequal starting endowment treatment with 
senders starting with 25 rand and receivers starting with 10 rand. We used the treatment with 
unequal endowments because it more closely represents an actual microfinance situation in 
which both initial assets and returns are seldom equal between members, as well as to explore 
fairness issues in the trust game.  
The trust game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the sender has to choose how 
much of the initial endowment to send to the receiver (the ratio of the amount sent to the 
initial endowment is considered a measure of trust). The amount sent is then multiplied by 
three by the experimenter and passed to the receiver. In the second stage, the receiver then has 
the opportunity to return some of the received amount back to the sender (the ratio of the 
amount returned to the amount received is considered a measure of trustworthiness).  
In Berd, approximately two weeks after completing the general survey, twelve groups 
of ten to eighteen subjects, were formed and allocated to the different games, depending on 
whether they were chosen to play the trust game before or after participating in the 
microfinance game. In addition, as we explain below, we did control for whether the subjects 
began their professional lives before (or during) perestroika or post-perestroika. The reading 
of the instructions occurred in front of the entire group.  During the actual playing of the 
game, the pairings remained anonymous. 
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In Nyanga, the trust game experiments were played between pairs of individuals from 
opposite sides of town with no previous level of social connection.  Approximately one week 
after completing the general survey, six groups of fourteen to eighteen subjects were randomly 
formed and over the course of four days were called to the SHAWCO Senior Center.  As in 
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000), the subjects saw with whom they were 
matched but we ensured that they had never met one another before the game to control for 
the effect of personal social connectedness on trust behavior.  Individuals who arrived 
together or talked with each other were not paired together; otherwise, they were paired so as 
to maximize the physical distance between their households and, therefore, to minimize the 
chances that they had a personal relationship (corroborated by an exit interview).  The pairings 
were not made public before the reading of the instructions. 6  The subjects were then divided 
into two groups, senders and receivers.  One pair at a time, they proceeded into a different 
room where a second experimenter ran the trust game experiment and administered the exit 
questionnaire.  Summary results from the trust games are given in the appendix in Table A-1. 
Microfinance Game 
The microfinance experiment follows Abbink et. al. (2002), with some minor 
modifications.  A group of six individuals receive a loan of 30 rand (3,000 drams in Berd), for 
which all group members are jointly liable for repayment.  The loan enables each member of 
the group to invest 5 rand (500 drams) in an individual risky project.  All projects are of the 
same type and the probability of success is 5/6.  In the event of a successful project, the 
investor receives a project payoff of 12 rand (1200 drams).  If the project fails, however, the 
subject receives zero. 
After the outcomes of the projects are realized, the group loan plus interest must be 
repaid.  We assumed a group loan interest rate of 20%, so that the group is liable to repay a 
total amount of 36 rand (3600 drams). The individuals whose project failed cannot contribute 
                                                 
6
 Instructions for all experiments are available at http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/acassar. 
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to group loan repayment, so the group debt is split among those individuals whose projects 
succeed and decide to contribute. Information on the individual project’s success or failure is 
private so that no other member of the group can ascertain whether a group partner’s defaults 
are due to project failure or strategic decision-making. In this environment, loan repayment 
ensues in the absence of contract enforceability. 
Since the debt is evenly divided among those individuals who are both able and willing 
to contribute, the fewer the number of contributors, the higher their burden.  Since 
contributions can only be financed from the current project payoffs, full repayment is only 
possible if at least half of the group members (three subjects) decide to contribute.  At the end 
of the round, the players are informed about the number of contributors, but not their 
identities, and their resulting payoff (one’s project payoff minus own share of repayment).  
If the group fulfils its repayment obligation, the game continues into a further round, which 
proceeds in the same way with the same group members.  If more than half the group 
members default, regardless of whether the default is strategic or due to project failure, then 
the group cannot repay the full amount, and no further rounds are played.  We like this feature 
of the game because it replicates the dynamic incentives utilized by most microfinance 
institutions, which make follow-up loans conditional on the full repayment of previous loans.   
One aspect of the experiment of Abbink et. al. has been questioned by some 
researchers (for example Morduch and Armendáriz de Aghion, 2005), namely that the results 
of the experiment are more difficult to interpret because participants are told that it will 
consist of a finite number of rounds (ten), leading to the traditional unraveling problem in 
which non-contribution in all rounds is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.  We consequently 
modify their experiment slightly by creating, after the sixth round, a 1/6 probability that a 
group continues for another round. To minimize contamination from subjects taking into 
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account an impending end-game, we utilize data from rounds one to six in our analysis.  (Our 
fundamental results are unchanged by excluding the small amount of data from later rounds.)   
To most efficiently isolate the effect of social capital on group performance, the 
microfinance game groups were formed so as to maximize the number of group members 
who shared the same clan name in Nyanga. To carry out tests for social homogeneity within 
groups, some groups were “stacked” with individuals who shared the same clan name, which 
were made public during pre-game introductions; otherwise, they were randomly formed. 
The microfinance experiments were played about one week after the trust game experiments.   
In the Berd experiment, one-third of the microfinance groups were formed by those 
who began their working lives before or during perestroika, one-third by individuals who 
began their working lives post-perestroika, and one-third was mixed (we used a cut-off age of 
36 to identify this).  The experiments were played either one week before the trust games or 
one week after, depending on the subject pool.  Subjects knew who belonged to their 
microfinance group in order to test for the effect of heterogeneity on repayment. 
3. Empirical Results 
 We perform estimations on two separate units of observation.  First, we look at the 
repayment behavior of individuals in the microfinance games as a function of (a) negative 
shocks to themselves and the other five group members;  (b) contributions by other members;  
(c) measures of acquaintanceship and personal trust level between the given individual and 
other members in the group; (d) measures of generalized trust by the given individual in the 
society and culture around them; (e) results from the trust game; and (f) social/cultural group 
homogeneity between the individual member and other group members.  (Means and standard 
deviations of our independent variables are provided in Table 1.) 
 Ideally for our type of unbalanced panel data, one would like to employ fixed or 
random effects estimation.  However, the time-invariant nature of most of the important 
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variables in our study precludes fixed-effect estimation.  We carried out a Hausman test for the 
feasibility of a random effects estimator (which can be used on time-invariant data) vis-à-vis 
fixed effects on our four time-variant variables, but the Hausman test rejected the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity of these right-hand-side variables at the 1% level.  Instead, we run 
OLS on the average contribution of each individual for every round in which the borrower 
was able to contribute to group repayment (experienced no shock), the only weakness with 
this approach being possible path dependence in the denominator of the dependent variable.  
We report these estimations for our pilot study in Nyanga and our larger study in Berd in 
Table 3.  To act as a check on these estimations for our principal study in Berd, we employ a 
logit estimation on our pooled, unbalanced panel data in Table 4, being aware that such an 
estimation does overweight the frequency of individuals in the sample from groups with 
longer duration.  We therefore employ an additional check on these estimations, which is also 
included in Table 4, a logit estimation on individual rounds in Berd, for which there is no 
doubt of pure exogeneity or sample bias, but where estimations are performed on a sequence 
of smaller samples.  To respect space constraints, we include rounds 2 through 5, before most 
groups had ceased repayment; the estimations on later rounds yield little additional insight, but 
are available upon request.  Fortunately, we find remarkable consistency from our three types 
of estimations on individual repayment. 
 Next, we examine the repayment behavior at the borrowing group level using means 
and aggregates of many of these variables for each group of six borrowers.  We present the 
results in Table 5, where we first show estimations for the 26 microfinance game groups in 
Berd.  The dependent variable is the number of rounds of borrowing group survival, upon 
which we carry out OLS estimations.  Summaries of group longevity and contribution rates in 
Berd and Nyanga are in Table 2.  In this table we also present some estimations where we 
combine the Berd-Nyanga data set of 36 groups.  For both Nyanga and Berd we created 
 18 
measures of group heterogeneity along the lines of what seems to be the most important 
cultural divisions in the respective societies.  In Nyanga the greatest cultural distinction seems 
to fall along the lines of clan membership.  But in Berd, due to the tremendous changes in 
post-Soviet society, the greatest social and cultural division there is not ethnic, but 
generational.  Those who began work after Perestroika possess an economic and cultural 
outlook that is unusually distinct from that of the older generation.  Along these lines we 
created statistically comparable indices of heterogeneity for our 36 borrowing groups, 10 in 
Nyanga and 26 in Berd.  While the differences in heterogeneity are obviously quite distinct 
(ethnic vs. generational), we think it worthwhile to examine some aggregated measure of 
heterogeneity across our two study areas.  We also examine heterogeneity in groups between 
“insiders” and “outsiders”, creating an index that is more heterogeneous (homogeneous) if the 
group contains a larger (smaller) variation of long-term residents and newcomers as measured 
by the standard deviation in the number of years of members’ local residency.  We summarize 
our results below and juxtapose them to those of related empirical literature when appropriate 
comparisons can be made: 
(a) Shocks 
 To no surprise, the results show that negative random shocks impact both individual 
and group repayment.  In our Berd estimations we found individual repayment to be higher 
when a member had received a shock the period before (implying other members had covered 
for her).  Repayment also increased as a function of the total number of shocks in the OLS 
estimations (recalling that our reference for individual repayment includes those rounds only in 
which she did not receive a negative shock).  We interpret this as evidence of reciprocity among 
our subjects: As an individual has been helped by other group members, she is more likely to 
contribute given the opportunity the next time.  The effect is large and statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  For every additional negative shock received, it increases the fraction of times 
she contributes on average somewhere between 0.30 and 0.40, depending on our specification.  
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This finding supports a large theoretical literature on the prevalence and importance of 
reciprocity among similar populations pioneered by Scott (1976) and Fafchamps (1992). 
 Shocks to other members have a negative effect on individual contributions, which is 
statistically significant in Nyanga.  It appears that when players sense that the end of the game 
is impending due to a lack of contributions by other members, this causes the individual to 
want to avoid being the “sucker” who contributes futilely in the last round.  In the group 
estimations in Table 5, we see that an increase in the mean number of shocks per round by 
one reduces the number of rounds the borrowing group continues to receive loans by 
about 1.7.   
(b) Effect of Others’ Contributions 
 Theory would posit that the contributions of other group members could have 
differential effects: Contributions by other members could generate peer effects or fairness 
effects that stimulate one's own contribution, or it could provoke free-rider problems.  In Berd 
we find very modest evidence that the contributions of others in the prior period increase 
one's own desire to contribute in the following period.  While none of the coefficients is 
significant, the variable consistently carries a positive sign on repayment in every specification.  
(c) Personal Trust 
 Our principal measure of personal trust is the question, "Would you lend (person x) 
1000 drams (100 rand)?”  Answering yes to this question for increasing numbers of individuals 
in the group has a positive effect on both individual contributions and group longevity.  The 
coefficient carries the (correct) positive sign in virtually all of the estimations, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in our most important estimation on the entire sample in Table 4.  
These results would seem to be consistent with Abbink et. al. (2002) who find that randomly 
formed groups perform less well than self-selected groups of friends, among which a greater 
level of trust presumably exists. 
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  We interpret these results on personal trust as some evidence for the importance of 
screening and self-selection in borrowing groups; personal trust appears to play a far more 
important role than simple acquaintanceship.  Mere acquaintanceship with other individuals in 
the group before the experiment (“Do you know person x?) is insignificant in virtually all of 
the estimations, and negatively significant in round 5 in Table 4.  The implication is that group 
lending may not be successful when people simply know one another well; it is more likely to 
succeed where people can choose among a large number of trustworthy group members.   
Moreover, the data show distance between members’ homes to be (surprisingly) positively 
related to group performance.  To the extent that someone needs to know another individual, 
or at least know of  her and live somewhat close to her to impose some type of social sanction 
in response to suspected defections in the game, our results offer little support to Besley and 
Coate’s (1995) hypothesis that the potential for social sanctions is vital to group lending.  
Trust that others will contribute their share is far more significant in our study. 
(d) Generalized Trust 
 While generalized trust in society is likely to be integral at a broader level, such as in 
the establishment of institutions and governance structures, positive answers to the General 
Social Survey questions proved to be insignificant as a determinant of behavior in the 
microfinance game, and often carry an unexpected sign.  This is consistent with the results of 
Frey and Bohnet (1999), who find that an accurate portrayal of cooperative behavior is only 
revealed when “social distance” diminishes and subjects interact with an identifiable person.  
Our finding contrasts somewhat in this respect with Karlan (2005) who finds that the GSS 
survey questions relative to societal trust were negatively associated with default among his 
sample of Peruvian microfinance borrowers.  It is difficult to explain the insignificance of 
social capital reflected in the GSS questions, other than by noting that this fits a pattern in our 
empirical results.  This pattern clearly points to the relative importance for group lending of 
personalized trust over generalized trust in society, and that answers to specific, contextual 
questions, such as "Would you lend (person x) 1000 drams (100 rand)?” are a more powerful 
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indicator of behavior than generalized questions.  Thus, if group members have an interest in 
being members of well-functioning groups, then self-selection should create endogenously 
formed groups with a high level of specific trust among members.  Because self-selection relies 
on specific trust and not general trust, our results would suggest that self-selected groups 
should function better.  This result appears consistent with what Ahlin and Townsend (this 
feature) find on the importance of self-selection and screening among their borrowers in 
central Thailand. 
(e) Effect of Trust Game Results 
 We use our trust game to generate measures of both trust and trustworthiness that may 
be useful in understanding behavior in our microfinance game.  In short, consistent with 
Karlan (2005), in our experiment, we uncovered no evidence that trusting behavior is at all 
positively related to greater rates of contribution to group loans. (He actually finds that it is 
negatively related, and interprets the result as possibly due to risk-loving behavior.)   
 We find some evidence that trustworthiness is related to contributions, an effect that  
is fairly substantial in the Berd estimations: If a receiver returned all of the coins passed to him 
in the trust game, it increases his probability of contribution in the microfinance game by 
about 40 percentage points.  Thus, a subject who was trustworthy as a receiver in the trust 
game tended to be a strong contributor in the microfinance game.  Since players were 
anonymous in the trust game, the significance of the trustworthiness variable may reflect 
borrower quality or dependability, meaning that a community of dependable people may be 
likely to be a community of well-performing borrowing groups.  However, the coefficient on 
trustworthiness was insignificant in Nyanga and in the group estimations. 
(f) Social Homogeneity 
 Many researchers and development practitioners have believed for some time that 
social cohesion has played a major role in credit group performance.   Empirical evidence 
from actual field data has been mixed on the question with some such as Zeller (1998) finding 
positive effects of a variable counting the number of common characteristics among members. 
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Karlan (2005) finds that ethnically homogeneous pairs are more trusting in the Peruvian 
experiments.  Other results, such as Wydick (1999), find that the stronger social ties between 
members, the less credible the threat of social sanctions becomes.  Alin and Townsend (this 
feature) also find evidence that existing social ties may hinder group loan repayment.   
 The results from our field experiments lend measured empirical support to the idea 
that social homogeneity is a good thing for group loan repayment.  In Nyanga, individual 
contributions are significantly associated at the 95% level with the number of members from 
the same clan in the group, as seen in Table 3.  Although two very different kinds of social 
heterogeneity characterize Nyanga and Berd, for the combined estimations in Table 5 we use a 
common diversity index of similar/dissimilar members (by clan and pre-and post Perestroika) 
and find the point estimate showing heterogeneity to have negative effects, but statistically 
insignificant.  Table 5 also shows heterogeneity in groups as measured by long-term vs. short-
term residents.  The coefficient on the standard deviation of number of years residing in the 
local area has the expected sign, and is significant at the 99% level in Berd and at the 95% level 
in the combined estimations.  Taken in light of other research, our results support the idea that 
social and cultural group homogeneity is likely to exert a positive influence on loan repayment.   
4. Conclusion 
Researchers face a puzzle in disentangling the diverse aspects of social capital and their 
influence on borrower behavior in joint-liability loan contracts.  We view our experimental 
results as one piece to this puzzle.  In contrast to other work, including the other work in this 
feature, we employ artefactual and framed field experiments that allow us to work at the 
problem from a particular angle through imposing a maximum degree of exogeneity on our 
estimations, while using subjects who closely represent the population of individuals that 
actually receives group loans in developing countries.  We view this kind of experimental work 
relative to other techniques, such as estimations on field data, not as substitutes, but instead as 
complements in this puzzle-solving process. Our goal for this research, and its contribution to 
this feature, is that it be part of an effort that collectively triangulates on a better understanding 
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of group lending.  In this sense we cannot claim general inference from our findings, but 
instead that our results be viewed in light of the wide array of empirical methodologies focused 
on the same question.  Taken in this context, it is interesting that our results support many of 
the traditional beliefs about group lending and work from other types of empirical studies.   
At the outset of this paper we divided theories about group lending into three 
categories: those that emphasize the importance of relational social capital to group lending, 
those that emphasize the importance of informational social capital, and those that emphasize 
the inherent contractual benefits of joint-liability contracts.  That we find socially 
heterogeneous groups consistently performing worse than socially homogeneous groups 
supports the notion that relational social capital matters to group lending.   Social homogeneity 
appears to facilitate a confidence that other members will indeed repay, augmenting the belief 
that the group is likely to receive subsequent loans in the future, and that those who do repay 
in early rounds won’t get burned by non-repayers.  We also find evidence of reciprocity within 
groups as group members who have realized more shocks (and relied on others to pay for 
them in the past) are more likely to repay the next time they have the opportunity.  Thus we 
find that social capital appears to grow with positive experiences from other members 
following through with repayment in the group.   
Additionally, we believe that our finding that personal trust between specific pairs of 
group members significantly affects performance in our microfinance games is significant.  
First, it implies that group lending is likely to be more successful when a borrower faces a pool 
of potential borrowing partners that contains a large number of people whom she personally 
trusts.  Moreover, to the extent that borrowers have a choice within this pool, it supports the 
notion that informational social capital in the process of group self-selection and screening is 
likely to matter in group lending.  Although in our experiments borrowing groups are formed 
exogenously, if personal trust matters to group performance in practice, then borrowers will 
have an incentive to self-select over this variable.   
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In contrast, we find traditional measures of general, society-wide social capital, such as 
reflected by the commonly used GSS questions to be mostly insignificant.  In many respects, 
this result is unsurprising: Repayment under dynamic incentives is individually rational when 
group members believe that the group as a whole will perform well enough to continue 
receiving future loans.  This should depend on the confidence that borrowers have in the 
particular individuals within the borrowing group far more than their confidence in society 
generally.  That we find the strength of acquaintanceship between members and the distance 
between their homes to be insignificantly (and in some specifications negatively) related to 
group performance would seem to imply that the most important component of relational 
capital may be interpersonal trust between members rather than the underlying threat of social 
sanctions for non-contribution. 
One caveat to our findings and those from similar research based on field data is that a 
high degree of social capital between group members is probably insufficient in and of itself to 
generate high repayment rates.  For example, the relative importance of within-group social 
capital in preventing defaults may well be weaker than the mere threat of group expulsion, the 
availability of alternative credit, or the intensity and quality of loan officer activity.   As shown 
in Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (this issue), other institutional factors matter greatly to 
borrower performance and the performance of microfinance institutions generally, such as 
investments in quality loan officers and other staff.  There is probably no single factor that is 
alone responsible for the frequent success with group lending in so many areas of the 
developing world, but this research suggests that relational social capital between members 
appears to be one significant factor in this success. 
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  Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Group Repayment 
Variables: 
Berd, 
Armenia 
X , σ 
Nyanga,  
South Africa 
X , σ 
 
Individual 
Repayment 
Variables: 
Berd, 
Armenia 
X , σ 
No. Observations n = 26 n = 10 No. Observations n = 498 
4.192 3.000 0.731 Number of Rounds 
Reached by Group (1.650) (1.563) 
Subject Contributes 
in Round  (0.444) 
     
1.119 1.358 0.143 Mean  Per Period 
Shocks 
Received by Group 
(0.678) (0.416) 
Shock to Subject 
Period Before (0.350) 
     
1.489 0.733 0.713 Mean Number of 
Others Acquaintances 
in Group 
(1.033) (0.424) 
Shocks to Others in 
Group 
Period Before 
(0.800) 
     
1.590 0.450 3000.00 Mean Number Others 
Would Loan to in 
Group 
(0.849) (0.385) 
Contrib. by Others 
in Group - Period 
Before (Dram) (416.94) 
     
26.727 10.851 1.382 Mean Distance, km 
b/t Members’ Homes (5.428) (1.705) 
Num. of Acquaintances 
in Group (1.318) 
     
17.867 2.427 1.677 
Mean Fraction of Life 
Lived in Area (13.114) (0.383) 
Num. of Group 
Members Subject 
Would Loan to 
(1.753) 
     
0.243 0.750 26.668 Heterogeneity-Fraction 
Life Lived in Area (0.129) (0.339) 
Mean Distance 
to Others’ Homes (8.028) 
     
0.587 0.400 0.1684 Percent Members 
Work After 
Perestroika/Same Clan 
(0.3589) (0.378) 
Fraction of Life 
Lived in Area (0.266) 
     
0.298 0.477 0.752 Heterogeneity in 
Peer Group/Clan, 
(given by std.dev.) 
(0.243) (0.402) 
Fraction of Others 
in Peer Group (0.250) 
     
0.428 0.334 0.431 
Sender Trust 
(0.158) (0.103) 
Sender Trust 
 (Only Senders) (0.246) 
     
0.437 0.360 0.441 Receiver 
Trustworthiness (0.140) (0.192) 
Receiver 
Trustworthiness 
(Only Receivers) 
(0.228) 
     
0.660  0.637 GSS#1: 
Trust Question (0.200)  
GSS#1: 
Trust Question (0.481) 
     
0.679  0.677 GSS#2: 
Fairness Question (0.194)  
GSS#2: 
Fairness Question (0.468) 
     
0.346  0.357 GSS#3: 
Helpfulness Quest. (0.210)  
GSS#3: 
Helpfulness  Question (0.480) 
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Table 2: Frequencies of Failures and Contribution Decisions 
(number of groups, number of actual contributors) 
               Round 
               Number 
Berd, Armenia  Nyanga, South Africa  
 % Failures % Contributions % Failures % Contributions 
1 21.79% 71.79% 15.0% 68.33% 
 (26, 112) (10, 41) 
2 16.0% 62.67% 25.93% 48.15% 
 (25, 94) (9, 26) 
3 15.87% 62.70% 13.33% 56.67% 
 (21, 79) (5, 17) 
4 14.58% 57.29% 33.33% 50.0% 
 (16, 55) (3,  9) 
5 9.72% 63.89% 16.67% 50.0% 
 (12, 46) (2, 6) 
6 11.11% 70.37% 33.33% 66.67% 
 (9, 38) (1, 4) 
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Table 3: Individual Repayment Decisions--Nyanga and Berd 
Dependent Variable:  Fraction of Times Repaid Divided by Opportunities to Repay† 
---OLS Estimations---  
 
Variable: 
Indiv. Repayment:  
Nyanga, South Africa 
Indiv. Repayment:  
Berd, Armenia 
No. of Observations: n = 54 n = 54 n = 151 n = 151 
Intercept 1.296*** 1.294*** 0.629*** 0.621*** 
 (0.363) (0.362) (0.200) (0.221) 
     
-0.539* -0.496 -0.256 -0.261 Mean Contribution  
from Others (0.349) (0.349) (0.193) (  0.202) 
     
-0.111 -0.096 0.347*** 0.335*** Mean Shocks  
Received--Self (0.276) (0.279) (0.137) (0.141) 
     
-0.215* -0.198 -0.036 -0.036 Mean Shocks  
Received—Others (0.138) (0.138) ( 0.045) (0.046) 
     
0.058 0.026 -0.013 -0.013 Knows Others 
in Group (0.108) (0.109) (0.021) (0.022) 
     
-0.015 0.036 0.039*** 0.038*** Mean Would Loan to 
each Indiv. in Group (0.121) (0.123) (0.016) (0.016) 
     
0.004 0.002 0.006*** 0.006*** Mean Distance 
to Others’ Homes (0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
-0.077 -0.051 0.001 0.001 Fraction of Life 
Lived in Area (0.070) (0.072) (0.001) (0.0009) 
     
0.178*** 0.183*** 0.033 0.033 Fraction of Others 
in Peer Group/Clan  (0.078) (0.078) (0.107) (0.108) 
     
 -0.151 0.046 0.061 Average Sender Trust 
From Trust Game  (0.286) (0.122) (0.126) 
     
 -0.293 0.098 0.105 Average Receiver 
Trustworthiness  (0.200) (0.121) (0.123) 
     
   -0.034 GSS#1:  
Trust Question    (0.061) 
     
   0.017 GSS#2: 
Fairness Question    (0.061) 
     
   0.067 GSS#3: 
Helpfulness Question    (0.056) 
    Nyanga Dummy 
    
R-Squared      0.1882 0.2272 0.1222 0.1326 
Adj R-Squared      0.0439 0.0475 0.0600 0.0509 
F-Statistic     1.30 1.26 1.96 1.62 
F-Signif. 0.265 0.280 0.042 0.086 
 
***95% Significance, **90% Significance, *85% Significance.   
Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Individual Repayment Decisions in Microfinance Game--Berd  
Dependent Variable: Individual Contributes in Round = 1 
---Binary Logit on Pooled Panel Data--- 
 
Variable: 
Only 
Trustors 
Only 
Trustees All Rounds Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
Number of Observations: n = 213 n = 214 n = 427 n = 126 n = 106 n = 82 n = 65 
Intercept -2.981 -4.789 -3.335 -12.061* -2.630 -3.059 -5.935 
 (4.780)   (4.360) (3.127) (8.163) (8.986) (8.685) (8.468) 
        
1.936** 1.435 1.766*** 3.023* 2.077 2.956 2.744 Subject Contributed  
Period Before (1.184) (1.064) (0.773) (2.027) (2.266) (2.165) (2.277) 
        
1.452*** 0.770 1.131*** 1.096 1.412* 1.562* 3.871*** Shock to Subject  
Period Before (0.545) (0.630) (0.401) (1.077) (0.993) (1.039) (1.583) 
        
-0.373* -0.179 -0.253* -0.043 -0.053 -0.375   -0.386   Shocks to Others in Group  
Period Before (0.247) 0.236 (0.165) (0.420) (0.541) (0.386) (0.668) 
        
0.0002 0.0007 0.0005 0.002 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 Contributions by Others  
in Group - Period Before (0.001) (0.001)   (0.0009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
0.159 -0.161 -0.054 -0.234 -0.231 0.179 -0.448* Num. of Acquaintances in 
Group (0.163) (0.139) (0.099) (0.210) (0.238) (0.239) (0.306) 
        
0.174* 0.280*** 0.241*** 0.508*** 0.447*** -0.080   0.353* Num. of Group Members 
Subject Would Loan to (0.124) (0.120) (0.079) (0.191) (0.227) (0.162) (0.227) 
        
0.045* 0.054* 0.042*** 0.087*** 0.028 -0.005 0.100** Mean Distance 
to Others’ Homes (0.030) (0.021) (0.017) (0.036) (0.042) (0.037) (0.053)   
        
0.005 0.008 0.008* 0.014* 0.005 -0.006 0.035** Fraction of Life 
Lived in Area (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.021) 
        
0.057 0.347 0.180 0.631 -1.041 2.192**   -1.218 Fraction of Others 
in Peer Group (0.732)   (0.742) (0.486) (0.919) (1.255) (1.187) (1.481) 
        
-0.405 -0.175 -0.228 -0.174 0.023 -0.070 -1.474** GSS#1:  
Trust Question (0.393) (0.402) (0.263) (0.556) (0.610) (0.633) (0.779) 
        
  0.614* 0.192 0.261 0.637 0.879* -1.013* 0.441 GSS#2: 
Fairness Question (0.419) (0.395) (0.260) (0.539) (0.598) (0.663)   (0.805)   
        
0.418 0.174 0.266 0.116 1.504** -0.092 -0.770 GSS#3: 
Helpfulness Question (0.386) (0.416) (0.267) (0.525) (0.827) (0.616) (0.726)   
        
0.137       Sender Trust 
From Trust Game (0.736)       
        
 1.523**      Receiver Trustworthiness 
From Trust Game  (0.833)      
        
Likelihood Ratio    29.4118 34.4995 53.4543 25.0006 34.9393 17.9668 18.3098 
p-value     0.0057   0.0010 <0.0001 0.0148 0.0005 0.1167 0.1066 
 
***95% Significance, **90% Significance, *85% Significance.  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Group Repayment Decisions  
Dependent Variable:  Number of Rounds Reach by Group in Microfinance Game, µ = 3.861 
---OLS Estimates--- 
 
Variable: 
Group Repayment:  
Berd, Armenia 
Combined Estimations: 
 Berd and Nyanga 
Number of Observations: n = 25 n = 24 n = 24 n = 35 n = 35 n = 34 
Intercept 10.023*** 9.132*** 9.887*** 4.390*** 7.024*** 7.638*** 
 (2.041) (2.543) (2.720) (1.725) (1.989) (2.448) 
       
-1.713*** -1.708*** -1.714*** -1.598*** -1.721*** -1.665*** Mean  Per Period Shocks  
Received by Group (0.336) (0.387) (0.413) (0.372) (0.357) (0.400) 
       
0.233 0.324 0.609* 0.057 0.134 0.013 Mean Number of Acquaintances 
in Group (0.287) (0.331) (0.370) (0.308) (0.308) (0.346) 
       
0.021 0.040 0.033 0.677*** 0.433 0.448 Mean Would Loan to 
Other Indivs. in Group (0.318) (0.343) (0.389) (0.331) (0.334) (0.348) 
       
-0.063 -0.053 -0.038 0.016 -0.018 -0.023 Mean Distance 
b/t Members’ Homes (0.048) (0.0540) (0.0515) (0.053) (0. 053) (0.058) 
       
0.075*** 0.090*** 0.067*    Mean Fraction of Life 
Lived in Area (0.0332) (0.039) (0.041)    
       
-0.116*** -0.122*** -0.097***  -0.043*** -0.051*** Heterogeneity-Fraction  
Life Lived in Area (0.030) (0.033) (0.035)  (0.018) (0.022) 
       
-1.656** -1.457* -1.630**    Percent Members 
Work After Perestroika (0.857) (9.324) (0.892)    
       
-0.473 0.423 0.775  -0.952 -1.193 Heterogeneity in 
Peer Group/Clan (1.07) (1.437) (1.669)  (1.090) (1.248) 
       
 -1.851 -2.515   0.924 Sender Trust 
From Trust Game  (2.172) (2.211)   (1.810) 
       
 2.021 2.600   -1.488 Receiver Trustworthiness 
 (2.167) (2.344)   (1.648) 
       
  -2.890    GSS#1:  
Trust Question   (2.286)    
       
  -0.971    GSS#2: 
Fairness Question   (1.765)    
       
  2.036    GSS#3: 
Helpfulness Question   (1.464)    
       
   0.2593 0.1462 0.1514 Nyanga Dummy 
   (1.136) (1.099) (1.175) 
       
R-Squared      0.7126 0.7119 0.8015 0.4885 0.5713 0.5710 
Adj R-Squared      0.5774 0.5061 0.5670 0.4032 0.4641 0.4166 
F-Statistic     5.27 3.46 3.42 5.73 5.33 3.70 
F-Signif. 0.002 0.017 0.024 0.0008 0.0006 0.0046 
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Appendix: Results of Trust Games 
 
(A.)   Table A-1 
 
Sender's Trust 
 
— Berd — 
 
Nyanga 
 
(% Amount Sent to 
Receiver) 
 
 
All Games 
 
Equal Initial 
Amounts 
 
Unequal Initial 
Amounts 
 
Unequal Initial 
Amounts 
0 - - - - 
(0 - 25%] 25.0 20.8 29.1 55.0 
(25% - 50%) 30.8 35.1 26.6 21.7 
50% 29.5 28.6 30.4 - 
(50% - 75%] - - - 20.0 
(75% - 100%) 7.1 10.4 3.8 3.3 
100% 7.7 5.2 10.1 - 
Num. Obs.  156 77 79 60 
 
 
(B.) 
 
Receiver's 
Trustworthiness 
 
— Berd — 
All Games 
 (% Amount Sent Back to Sender) 
(% Amount Sent 
to Receiver) 0 
(0 - 
25%] 
(25% - 
50%) 50% 
(50% - 
75%] 
(75% - 
100%) 100% 
Num. 
Obs. 
0 - - - - - - - - 
(0 - 25%] - - 28.2 46.2 20.5 - 5.1 39 
(25% - 50%) - 29.2 39.6 10.4 8.3 8.3 4.2 48 
50% - 26.1 39.1 - 17.4 13.0 4.4 46 
(50% - 75%] - - - - - - - - 
(75% - 100%) - 63.6 18.2 - - 18.2 - 11 
100% - 16.7 50.0 33.3 - - - 12 
Num. Obs.  0 35 56 27 20 12 6 156 
 
 
 
(C.) 
 
Receiver's 
Trustworthiness 
 
— Berd — 
Equal Initial Amounts 
 (% Amount Sent Back to Sender) 
(% Amount Sent 
to Receiver) 
 
0 
(0 - 
25%] 
(25% - 
50%) 
 
50% 
(50% - 
75%] 
(75% - 
100%) 
 
100% 
 
No. Obs. 
0 - - - - - - - 0 
(0 - 25%] - - 37.5 37.5 12.5 - 12.5 16 
(25% - 50%) - 37.0 37.0 11.1 - 7.4 7.4 27 
50% - 9.1 54.6 - 18.2 18.2 - 22 
(50% - 75%] - - - - - - - 0 
(75% - 100%) - 75.0 25.0 - - - - 8 
100% - 50.0 - 50.0 - - - 4 
Num. Obs.  0 20 30 11 6 6 4 77 
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(D.) 
 
 
Receiver's 
Trustworthiness 
— Berd — 
Unequal Initial Amounts 
 (% Amount Sent Back to Sender) 
(% Amount Sent 
to Receiver) 
 
0 
(0 - 
25%] 
(25% - 
50%) 
 
50% 
(50% - 
75%] 
(75% - 
100%) 
 
100% 
 
No. Obs. 
0 - - - - - - - 0 
(0 - 25%] - - 21.7 52.2 26.1 - - 23 
(25% - 50%) - 19.1 42.9 9.5 19.1 9.5 - 21 
50% - 41.7 25.0 - 16.7 8.3 8.3 24 
(50% - 75%] - - - - - - - 0 
(75% - 100%) - 33.3 - - - 66.7 - 3 
100% - - 75.0 25.0 - - - 8 
Num. Obs.  0 15 26 16 14 6 2 79 
 
 
(E.) 
 
Receiver's 
Trustworthiness 
— Nyanga — 
Unequal Initial Amounts 
All Games 
 (% Amount Sent Back to Sender) 
(% Amount Sent 
to Receiver) 
 
0 
(0 - 
25%] 
(25% - 
50%) 
 
50% 
(50% - 
75%] 
(75% - 
100%) 
 
100% 
No. 
Obs. 
0 - - - - - - - - 
(0 - 25%] 12.9 19.35 61.29 - 6.45 - - 31 
(25% - 50%) - 38.46 15.38 30.77 - 15.38 - 13 
50% - - - - - - - - 
(50% - 75%] 33.33 33.33 16.67 - 16.67 - - 12 
(75% - 100%) - - - 100 - - - 2 
100% - - - - - - - 0 
Num. Obs.  8 15 23 6 4 2 0 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
